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Abstract
Stock market liberalizations provide a natural experiment to test
for the causal relation between ﬁnancial development and economic
growth. We test this relation by investigating whether liberalizations
facilitate growth through the particular mechanism of reducing capi-
tal market imperfections that drive a wedge between the external and
internal cost of capital to ﬁrms. Using panel data on a large sample
of emerging markets, we ﬁnd no evidence of a uniform shift across all
sectors in average industry growth following liberalization. Instead,
consistent with the hypothesis that liberalizations lower the incremen-
tal cost of external capital, it appears that industries that depend more
on external ﬁnance experience signiﬁcantly higher growth following lib-
eralization. We also ﬁnd that growth occurs through the creation of
new establishments, which is more likely to require external funds,
rather than through an expansion in the average size of existing estab-
lishments, which ﬁrms are more likely to ﬁnance with internal cash.
These results are robust to alternative hypotheses, country and in-
dustry speciﬁc controls, other economic reforms, world business cycle
eﬀects, and contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks.
∗Nandini Gupta is at the William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan
Business School, nandinig@umich.edu. Kathy Yuan is at the University of Michigan Busi-
ness School, kyuan@umich.edu. We thank Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales for use of
their data.
11 Introduction
Recent evidence from the economic growth and ﬁnance literature suggests
that a well-developed ﬁnancial sector is critical for economic growth (for a
survey see Levine (1997)). However, most studies in the literature ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to establish a causal link between ﬁnancial development and eco-
nomic growth because of the potentially endogenous determination of the
two. Our paper addresses this endogeneity issue in two ways. First, we use a
natural experiment, stock market liberalizations, to measure ﬁnancial devel-
opment. Second, we investigate a particular microeconomic channel through
which ﬁnancial development facilitates growth. Speciﬁcally, we investigate
if stock market liberalizations facilitate economic growth by reducing the
wedge between the cost of internal and external capital, so that industries
that depend more on external ﬁnancing for their capital expenditures are
likely to grow faster on average following liberalization.1
The literature linking economic growth and ﬁnancial development is ex-
tensive. In his seminal work, Goldsmith (1969) found evidence of a positive
relationship between economic growth and ﬁnancial development. A num-
ber of recent studies have attempted to also establish causality. In one of the
ﬁrst broad cross-sectional studies, King and Levine (1993) show that the ini-
tial level of ﬁnancial development can predict future economic growth. Also
using a cross-sectional framework, Levine and Zervos (1997) show that the
development of both banks and ﬁnancial markets are important for economic
growth. Rather than examining the broad correlation between ﬁnance and
growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998) make a signiﬁcant contribution to the
causality issue by examining a mechanism by which ﬁnancial development
can aﬀect economic growth. Based on the theoretical argument that well
developed ﬁnancial markets reduce the cost of external ﬁnance to ﬁrms, they
1The Modigliani and Miller theorem (1958) states that a ﬁrm’s capital structure is
irrelevant to its value if capital markets are perfect, so internal and external ﬁnancing are
perfect substitutes. With imperfect capital markets, however, the costs of internal and
external ﬁnance may diverge because of information asymmetries (Myers and Majluf 1984),
costly monitoring (Townsend 1979), and contract enforcement and incentive problems
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The less developed a ﬁnancial market, the larger the wedge
between the internal and external cost of capital. Recent empirical ﬁrm-level studies also
show that ﬁnancial development reduces ﬁnancing constraints for ﬁrms. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998), Love (2001), and Laeven (2002) provide cross-country evidence
that ﬁrms tend to be less ﬁnancially constrained in countries with more developed ﬁnancial
markets. Forbes (2002) ﬁnds that Chilean capital controls make it more diﬃcult for small
ﬁrms to obtain external ﬁnancing. Based on the existing theory and empirical evidence
we take the hypothesis that ﬁnancial development reduces external ﬁnancing constraints
as given, and investigate the real growth eﬀect of this mechanism.
2investigate whether industries that rely more on external ﬁnance for their
investment needs are likely to grow faster in economies with more developed
ﬁnancial markets. They argue that since diﬀerences in external dependence
between industries arise for technological reasons, these diﬀerences are likely
to persist across countries.2 Assuming that the well-developed capital mar-
kets of the U.S. allow ﬁrms to achieve the desired extent of external depen-
dence, they use data on listed U.S. ﬁrms to construct industry measures of
external ﬁnance dependence.3 Using the ratio of domestic credit plus stock
market capitalization to GDP and accounting standards in a country as
measures of ﬁnancial development, results from their cross-sectional analy-
sis suggest that the ex ante development of ﬁnancial markets facilitates the
ex post growth of sectors dependent on external ﬁnance.
In this paper, we extend Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) methodology in two
ways: ﬁrst, we focus on a natural experiment that addresses the potential
endogeneity of ﬁnancial development; second, we use panel data to explore
both cross-sectional and time series variation in ﬁnancial development and
economic growth. Stock market liberalizations are a political decision by the
government to allow foreigners to invest in domestic stock markets, hence
the literature on ﬁnancial development treats liberalization as an exoge-
nous event (see Kim and Singal (1989), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry
(2000a), (2000b), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002a),(2002b)). We
use diﬀerences in industry growth rates across temporal shocks of stock
market liberalization and across industries with diﬀerent degrees of exter-
nal dependence to investigate the external ﬁnance mechanism described in
Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Using data on a sample of 19 emerging economies that liberalized their
stock markets between 1986 and 1995, we ﬁnd no evidence of a uniform
shift across all sectors in average industrial growth rates following liber-
alization. Instead, we ﬁnd that industries that depend more on external
ﬁnance grow signiﬁcantly faster on average following liberalization. Hence,
our results suggest that liberalizations facilitate economic growth not simply
by reducing the overall cost of capital in the economy, but by reducing mar-
ket imperfections that drive a wedge between the internal and external cost
2For example, a sector like pharmaceuticals, with cash ﬂows coming in at a later stage of
development after huge research and development expenditures have been made upfront,
will have a greater demand for external ﬁnancing than sectors such as food processing.
3The external dependence measures developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) have been
widely used in the literature. Recent applications include Ceterolli and Gambera (2001),
Laeven, Klingebiel, and Kroszner (2002), Claessens and Laeven (2002), and Fisman and
Love (2002b).
3of capital. Consider the industries in the 20th percentile (Apparel) and the
80th percentile (Machinery, except electrical) of external ﬁnance dependence
with external dependence measures equal to .029 and .445, respectively. Our
results suggest that in the ﬁrst three years following a stock market liber-
alization, the real value added growth rate in these two industries increases
by .18 and 2.8 percent, respectively on average.4 For comparison, the av-
erage growth rate of real value added across all industries in our sample is
4.67 percent, while the growth rate of the industry at the median level of
external dependence is 3.99 percent.5 These results are robust to several
alternative measures of external dependence among U.S. ﬁrms in the same
industry. Decomposing the impact of liberalization further, we ﬁnd that
growth occurs primarily through the creation of new establishments rather
than through an expansion in the average size of existing establishments.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that companies are more likely to use
external funds to set up new establishments and internal funds to expand
the size of existing establishments.
To control for potential omitted variable bias, we include several time-
varying country and industry speciﬁc variables in the estimations. In partic-
ular, all the speciﬁcations control for industry and country size, institutional
environment, human capital, availability of credit in the economy, world
business cycle eﬀects, and contemporaneous economic shocks. The results
are also robust to the use of a larger sample of 31 countries that include
an additional four countries that do not liberalize and eight countries that
liberalize during the sample period.
We also investigate alternative explanations for the observed relationship
between stock market liberalization and growth. One potential explanation
is that what we observe is faster growth following liberalization in more cap-
ital intensive industries due to a lower overall cost of capital, rather than
in industries that depend more on external ﬁnance. We control for relative
investment intensity to investigate whether it is the lower overall cost of
capital or the lower incremental cost of external capital following liberal-
ization that facilitates industrial growth. Another hypothesis is that other
economic reforms that often accompany liberalization may have a confound-
ing impact on industrial growth. To isolate the eﬀects of liberalization, we
control for potential changes in trade policy, macroeconomic stabilization
programs, and the eﬀect of privatization at the industry level.
4These numbers are from the estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction term reported in
column 1 of Table 5B.
5These are the average growth rates for the 19 country sample.
4Our paper is closely related to two strands of literature in the area of
ﬁnancial development and economic growth. The ﬁrst strand investigates
the impact of ﬁnancial market deregulation on economic growth.6 On this
topic, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002a) study the eﬀects of stock
market liberalization on GDP growth rates. They ﬁnd that liberalizations
on average lead to a one percent increase in per capita GDP growth over a
ﬁve-year period. Using proxy measures for costs of capital (country credit
risk ratings) and ﬁnancial constraints (enforcement of insider trading laws),
they ﬁnd evidence that lower capital costs and reduced ﬁnancial constraints
increase economic growth on average. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) also
use a natural experiment to investigate the causal link between ﬁnance and
growth. Using bank branch deregulation at the state level in the United
States, they ﬁnd evidence that deregulation has a positive impact on growth
in per capita state income and output. Our approach diﬀers from these stud-
ies since, rather than examining the aggregate correlation between ﬁnance
and economic growth, we investigate a microeconomic channel by which
ﬁnancial development can aﬀect economic growth at the industry level.
The second strand of literature studies the relationship between ﬁnan-
cial development and industry growth. Ceterolli and Gambera (2001) use
the external dependence measures developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998)
to investigate the relationship between banking market structure and in-
dustrial growth. They ﬁnd that higher bank concentration promotes the
growth of more externally dependent industries, but has a negative impact
on overall industrial growth. Also using these external dependence mea-
sures, Laeven, Klingebiel, and Kroszner (2002) ﬁnd evidence that externally
dependent industries contract more following a ﬁnancial crisis in more de-
veloped ﬁnancial markets. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), Claessens
and Laeven (2002) use U.S. data to construct industry measures of tangi-
ble and intangible asset allocation, and ﬁnd that sectors that invest more
in intangible assets are likely to grow faster in countries with more secure
property rights. Finally, Fisman and Love (2002b) use an industry level
“propensity for trade credit” measure constructed from U.S. data to ﬁnd
that industries with a greater reliance on trade credit are likely to grow
faster in countries with weaker ﬁnancial institutions. All these studies use a
cross-sectional approach. Our framework diﬀers by incorporating both the
6There are also a number of studies that look at the eﬀect of stock market liberalization
on stock prices, volatility, and investment. Kim and Singal (1989) ﬁnd that stock returns
increase immediately after liberalization without an increase in volatility. Henry (2000a)
and (2000b) ﬁnds an increase in stock price and an investment boom after liberalization.
Chari and Henry (2001) ﬁnd an increase in Tobin’s Q after liberalization.
5cross-sectional eﬀect (the growth of liberalized versus closed economies since
liberalizations occur at diﬀerent times in the sample), and the temporal ef-
fect (the growth of liberalizing economies before and after liberalization) of
stock market liberalizations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
describe the data. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and the results
from the baseline growth regression. In Section 4 we decompose further
the sources of the growth impact of liberalization, and also investigate the
short-run and long-run impact on industry growth. In Section 5 we consider
alternative hypotheses and describe additional robustness checks. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Data
2.1 Data on Industries
2.1.1 External Dependence Measures
Data on the actual use of external ﬁnancing at the country and industry
level is typically not available for emerging markets. Moreover, the use of
external ﬁnancing would be endogenous to the availability of external cap-
ital in the country. To identify the dependence of an industry on external
ﬁnance, we use the measures constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Based on the argument that there are technological reasons for diﬀerences
in industries’ dependence on external ﬁnance, implying these diﬀerences are
likely to persist across countries, Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct mea-
sures of external ﬁnance dependence using Compustat data on listed U.S.
ﬁrms. Since U.S. capital markets are relatively frictionless, these measures
should capture diﬀerences in the technological demand for external ﬁnanc-
ing among industries. Thus, the use of external funds by U.S. ﬁrms in an
industry serves as a proxy for the amount foreign ﬁrms in the same industry
would have liked to raise if their ﬁnancial markets had been as developed.
This does not imply that the same sectors in two countries are required
to have the exact same optimal level of external dependence. Instead we
assume that the rank order of external dependence across sectors is similar
across countries.
More speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm’s dependence on external ﬁnance is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between capital expenditures and cash ﬂow from operations,
divided by capital expenditures; its dependence on equity ﬁnance is deﬁned
as the ratio of the net amount of equity issues to capital expenditures; and
6its investment intensity is deﬁned as the ratio of capital expenditures to
net property, plant, and equipment. To construct dependence on external
ﬁnance in the 1980s for each U.S. ﬁrm, the use of external ﬁnance is ag-
gregated over the 1980’s and divided by the sum of capital expenditures in
the 1980s. We use the median value of external dependence for U.S. ﬁrms
belonging to the same industry. Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct these
measures for a mixture of three and four digit ISIC level manufacturing
industries. Since the breakdown between the two ISIC levels is somewhat
arbitrary, we only use the external dependence measures for three digit ISIC
sectors. We also use external dependence in U.S. ﬁrms belonging to the same
industry measured over the 1970-1980 period, external dependence among
young ﬁrms (less than ten years since listing) and older ﬁrms (more than
ten years since listing). In Table 1 we report the median value of average
external dependence among U.S. ﬁrms in the same industry for each ISIC
sector, and for each of the measures of external dependence. We also report
the median value of average investment intensity and cash ﬂow intensity
between 1980-1990 in U.S. ﬁrms belonging to the same industry.
2.1.2 Data on Industry Growth
Annual data on value added and number of establishments at the three-digit
ISIC code level for each country are obtained from the Industrial Statistics
Database (1980-1999) compiled by the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (2001). Real value added is calculated by deﬂating value
added with the GDP deﬂator obtained from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators.7 We observe an unbalanced panel of industrial statistics
between the years 1981 to 1998 for the countries in our sample.
For each country and each of the 27 ISIC industrial categories we use
the annual growth rates of real value added, number of establishments, and
average establishment size as the dependent variables. Average industry
establishment size is deﬁned as real value added divided by number of es-
tablishments. Growth rates are calculated as the diﬀerence in the logs of
current and previous year values. In Table 1 we report the average growth
rate of real value added, number of establishments, and average establish-
ment size for each ISIC industry over the entire sample period.
7It may be appropriate to use the producer price index (PPI) rather than the GDP
deﬂator to deﬂate industrial statistics, however PPI data is not complete for the countries
and years in our sample. Results using the PPI deﬂator on the smaller sample were
substantively similar to the GDP deﬂator results.
72.2 Data on Countries
A stock market liberalization refers to the policy decision by a country’s
government to allow foreign investors to purchase shares in the country’s
stock markets. While the literature has also used other criteria in addition
to the policy decree to date liberalization (see Kim and Singal (1989), Henry
(2000b), and Bekaert and Harvey (2000)), we select the liberalization date
based on the year of the policy change. In contrast to this oﬃcial liber-
alization date, other measures of stock market liberalization such as when
foreign investors ﬁrst access a market or the ﬁrst country fund is established
may be endogenous to economic growth.
From the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) classiﬁcation of
economies we include all emerging economies that liberalized their stock
markets after 1980 (using the oﬃcial date of policy change) for which we
observe industrial statistics. Our initial sample consists of 19 economies
that liberalized their stock markets between 1986 and 1995. As a robust-
ness check, we also use an expanded sample of 31 countries, including an
additional eight liberalizing countries from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad
(2002b), who list these liberalizations as oﬃcial policy changes and describe
the speciﬁc change in policy in Table 2 of their paper. The larger sample also
includes four emerging markets that did not liberalize during the duration
of our data.
We obtain most of the country variables from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators, with the exceptions of legal origin (La Porta, Lopez
de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)), and the ratio of private credit to
GDP (Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000)). Data on stabilization programs is
obtained from Henry (2000a) and Hutchison (2001). We select only those
stabilization dates that are recorded in both sources for the countries in our
data. We also create a new dataset on privatization at the industry level
using data from the World Bank Privatization Database which reports all
privatization transactions at the ﬁrm level between 1989 and 1998. We add
industry information for each ﬁrm and obtain data on pre-1989 transactions
for countries that privatized prior to that year. This supplementary data is
obtained from news reports and reports published by country governments.8
Thus we observe annual data on privatizations undertaken in each country
in a given industry during the sample period.
Table 2 reports the stock market liberalization year for the liberalizing
countries and sample start and end years for all the countries. Table 3 re-
ports the average values of openness (ratio of export and imports to GDP),
8Data on stabilization programs and privatization are available on request.
8per capita real GDP, ratio of secondary school enrollment to total enroll-
ment, ratio of total credit to private ﬁrms to GDP, and the legal origin of
each country over the sample period.
3 The Eﬀect of Stock Market Liberalization on
Industrial Growth
3.1 An Empirical Model of Growth
To investigate the hypothesis that a stock market liberalization will lead to
faster growth in particular industries, we start with the following baseline
speciﬁcation:
Growthj,k,t = α0 + α1Libk,t + α2(Lib × External ﬁnance dependence)j,k,t
+α3(Industry share of manufacturing)j,k,t−1
+α4Opennessk,t + α5Englishk
+α6 log(Per capita GDP)k,t + α7Human capitalk,t
+α8(Private credit/GDP)k,t + α9OECD growtht
+αkCountry dummies + αt + j,k,t, (1)
where the dependent variables are the annual growth rates of real value
added, number of establishments, and average establishment size of industry
j in country k in year t. Lib is the liberalization dummy that is equal to one
for all years including and after the year of the regulatory change and αt
represents year dummies. Our approach is similar to a diﬀerence in diﬀerence
approach with a control group in each year that includes those countries that
have not yet liberalized.9 Since all industries in a given country share the
same liberalization date in addition to other country-speciﬁc characteristics,
the standard assumption that the error term is random and uncorrelated
across industries within each country may not be valid. Thus, in addition
to including country ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression, we adjust the variance-
covariance matrix used to calculate the standard errors in all the regressions
to account for clustering.
To investigate whether stock market liberalizations facilitate economic
growth by reducing the wedge between the cost of external and internal ﬁ-
nance to ﬁrms, we interact the liberalization dummy with diﬀerent measures
9The control group includes Nigeria, which liberalized in 1995 but for which industrial
statistics are not available after 1994. As a robustness check we subsequently expand this
sample to include 12 additional liberalizing and non-liberalizing countries.
9of external dependence in the corresponding industry in the U.S.10 These
measures include the fraction of capital expenditures not ﬁnanced with inter-
nal funds by U.S. ﬁrms between 1980-1990 (external ﬁnance dependence in
1980s), the fraction of capital expenditures not ﬁnanced with internal funds
by U.S. ﬁrms between 1970-1980 (external ﬁnance dependence in 1970s),
and the fraction of capital expenditures ﬁnanced through public oﬀerings
by U.S. ﬁrms between 1980-1990 (equity ﬁnance dependence in 1980s).
The principal variable of interest in equation (1) for our analysis is the
interaction term, which asks whether the eﬀect of liberalization on average
industry growth diﬀers across industries with diﬀerent degrees of dependence
on external funds. This oﬀers a direct test of the hypothesis that liberaliza-
tion facilitates economic growth by reducing the incremental cost of external
capital. A positive coeﬃcient indicates that more externally dependent in-
dustries are likely to grow faster following liberalization. Also of interest
in equation (1) is the coeﬃcient of the liberalization dummy, which tests
whether there is a uniform shift in the average growth rate across sectors
following stock market liberalization.
However, there is still a question as to whether even oﬃcial liberaliza-
tions are truly exogenous political decisions, or whether countries liberalize
in anticipation of higher growth. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002a)
argue that endogeneity of the liberalization decision may be an issue for
countries that join a free market, such as the European Union, where mem-
bership conditions require a simultaneous reduction in capital controls and
improvement in economic growth prospects. We do not have such liberal-
izations in our sample. Moreover, we avoid this potential endogeneity by
investigating whether particular industries grow faster following liberaliza-
tion rather than the impact of liberalization on aggregate economic growth.
As described below, we also conduct several robustness checks to determine
that the liberalization eﬀect is driving the results.
To avoid potential omitted variable bias, we include a number of coun-
try and industry speciﬁc variables in the speciﬁcations. At the industry
level the external dependence measures may act as a proxy for other indus-
10The external dependence measure does not enter the regression separately because
there is no theoretical basis for why growth rates should diﬀer according to relative external
dependence at a given level of ﬁnancial development. Thus, we set the coeﬃcient of
external dependence equal to zero before liberalization by not including it separately in
equation (1). However, to test this assumption we enter external dependence in place of
the interaction term in equation (1) and estimate this regression separately for the pre- and
post-liberalization data. The results support the assumption since we ﬁnd that external
dependence does not aﬀect growth using pre-liberalization data, but it has a statistically
signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient using the post-liberalization data.
10try characteristics that aﬀect growth. For example, there may be existing
cross-country diﬀerences in initial comparative advantage in certain indus-
tries that are due to factors not related to ﬁnancial development. Also,
industries with large market shares may have a lower growth potential than
smaller industries if there is industry-speciﬁc convergence. To address this
potential bias, we include each industry’s share of manufacturing, which is
the lagged ratio of annual real value added for each industry to total annual
real value added of manufacturing in each country, in all the regressions. It
may also be the case that external dependence acts as a proxy for capital in-
tensity. In Section 5 we directly test whether relative capital intensity rather
than external dependence drives the results. Lastly, we also estimate the
regressions including two-digit industry dummies, but do not report these
results as they are similar.
In addition to including country dummies we also include a number of
country speciﬁc variables in all the regressions. We control for the eﬀects
of a potential change in trade liberalization policy by including the ratio
of annual exports and imports to total GDP for each country. Since the
impact of stock market liberalization may diﬀer according to the size of the
country, we include annual per capita real GDP for each country. Following
the ﬁnancial development and growth literature, which has found evidence
of a signiﬁcant impact of human capital on growth (Bekaert, Harvey and
Lundblad (2002a), King and Levine (1993)), we include the ratio of annual
secondary school enrollment to total school enrollment in each country. To
control for potential diﬀerences in the institutional environment that can
have an impact on investment behavior we include a dummy variable that
is equal to one for countries that have an English legal origin (La Porta,
Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)). We also control for changes
in the overall availability of credit in the economy by including the annual
ratio of total credit given to private ﬁrms to GDP. Finally, we may overstate
the impact of liberalization if governments are likely to time liberalization to
coincide with a boom in the world business cycle. To separate business cycle
eﬀects and contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks from the liberalization
eﬀect on industrial growth, we include the average annual economic growth
rate of OECD economies and year dummies in all the regressions.
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (1) on the sample
of 19 countries for which we have an oﬃcial liberalization date, with the
growth rate of real value added as the dependent variable. We observe that
the estimated coeﬃcient of the liberalization dummy is positive but not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations. However, the coeﬃcient of
the interaction term in the ﬁrst column, external dependence in the 1980s
11times liberalization, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per-
cent level.11 We also ﬁnd that the next period growth rate in real value
added is signiﬁcantly lower (at the one percent level) for industries with rel-
atively high market shares, suggesting that there may be industry-speciﬁc
convergence. Openness to international trade, per capita GDP, fraction of
secondary school enrollment, and the availability of private credit do not
have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on industrial growth. However, coun-
tries of English legal origin experience signiﬁcantly higher industrial growth
(at the ten percent level). Faster growth in OECD economies on average
also has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on industrial growth
(at the one percent level).
It can be argued that U.S. ﬁrms in the 1980s are not a good basis for
comparison with the emerging market ﬁrms in our sample because the latter
are at a diﬀerent stage of development and may not face a similar techno-
logical need for external ﬁnance. As a robustness check we use external
dependence among U.S. ﬁrms in the 1970s. From the results reported in
column 2, we observe that the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant (at the ten percent level). Using another
alternative measure, dependence on equity ﬁnance in the 1980s, we ﬁnd in
column 3 that the coeﬃcient of the interaction term remains positive but is
no longer statistically signiﬁcant.12
The results in Table 4 indicate that a stock market liberalization does
not result in a uniform shift across all sectors in average industry growth,
suggesting that it does not facilitate growth simply by lowering the overall
cost of capital in the economy. Instead, it appears that liberalizations reduce
capital market imperfections that drive a wedge between the cost of internal
and external capital, so that industries that need more external ﬁnancing
grow faster on average following liberalization. We can use the coeﬃcient
estimates in Table 4 to infer how much higher the growth rate of the industry
in the 90th percentile of external dependence would be compared to the
industry in the 20th percentile following stock market liberalization. The
industry in the 90th percentile of external dependence in the 1980s, Electric
Machinery, has an external dependence ratio of .767. The industry in the
20th percentile, Apparel, has an external dependence ratio of .029. From the
11Including industry dummies in this speciﬁcation the estimated coeﬃcient and standard
error of this interaction term is .034(.015), which is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve
percent level.
12Estimating these speciﬁcations with industry dummies, we ﬁnd that the estimated
coeﬃcients of external dependence in the 1970s and equity dependence interacted with
liberalization have the correct sign but are not statistically signiﬁcant.
12coeﬃcient of the interaction term in column 1 we see that a stock market
liberalization would increase the real value added growth rate of the Electric
Machinery industry by 2.45 percent and the Apparel industry by .09 percent
on average.13
4 Further Decomposing the Sources of Growth
4.1 Growth in Number and Size of Establishments
To further explore the channels through which liberalization can aﬀect indus-
try growth, we investigate if growth occurs primarily through the addition
of new establishments to an industry or through an expansion in the size of
existing ﬁrms. The creation of new establishments is more likely to require
new funds, while the expansion of existing establishments can be ﬁnanced
with internal funds. Thus, we would expect the eﬀect of stock market liber-
alization to be more pronounced for growth in the number rather than the
average size of establishments.
The results reported in Table 5A suggest that this is indeed the case.
From the ﬁrst three columns of Table 5A we observe that a stock market lib-
eralization does not result in a uniform shift across all sectors in the average
growth rate of new establishments. Instead, it facilitates the creation of new
establishments in those sectors that rely more on external ﬁnancing. From
the last three columns of Table 5A, with growth in average establishment
size as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the liberaliza-
tion dummy is statistically signiﬁcant (at the ten percent level), but more
importantly the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is negative and not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Hence, it appears that stock market liberalizations, by
decreasing the relative cost of external capital, primarily aﬀect industrial
growth by stimulating the growth of new establishments.14
4.2 Growth Dynamics
Our results thus far suggest that stock market liberalizations will result in
signiﬁcantly higher growth on average in industries that rely more on exter-
nal ﬁnancing. Next we investigate the dynamics of the liberalization eﬀect
and separate the short, medium, and long-run impact of liberalization on
13The average growth rate in real value added of the Apparel industry is .083 while that
of Electric Machinery is .057 in the 19 country sample.
14In the remaining sections we do not report results using growth in average establish-
ment size as the dependent variable.
13growth in real value added. We deﬁne the ﬁrst three years following liberal-
ization as the short run, the subsequent three year period as the medium-run,
and the long-run as all the years following the ﬁrst six years after liberaliza-
tion. Using the 1980-1990 external dependence measures in the ﬁrst column
of Table 5B, we observe that liberalization has a statistically signiﬁcant and
positive eﬀect (at the ﬁve percent level) on industries that rely more on ex-
ternal ﬁnance in the ﬁrst three years following the opening up of the stock
market.15 Using the 1970-80 measures for external dependence, the coef-
ﬁcient of the short-run interaction term remains positive and statistically
signiﬁcant (at the ﬁve percent level). There also appears to be a positive
but less statistically signiﬁcant average impact on growth in the long-run (at
the ten percent level). Using equity dependence in the last column of Table
5B we ﬁnd that none of the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, but they
are correctly signed. These results are consistent with the previous evidence
that the eﬀect of liberalization depends on the relative external dependence
of an industry, and also suggest that more externally dependent industries
are able to access capital and catch up relatively quickly to the rest of the
economy.16 We obtain similar results if we deﬁne the short-run as the ﬁrst
ﬁve-year period following liberalization and the long-run as the subsequent
years.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Investment Intensity and Cost of Capital
An alternative explanation for the observed relationship between stock mar-
ket liberalization and growth is that industry variation in external depen-
dence acts as a proxy for relative capital intensity. Thus, liberalization
facilitates growth in these industries by lowering the overall cost of capital
in the economy rather than by decreasing the incremental cost of external
funds.17 While this hypothesis does not contradict our results regarding the
15Including industry dummies in the speciﬁcation the estimated coeﬃcient and standard
error of this interaction term is .064 (.025), which is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve
percent level.
16Henry (2000a) also ﬁnds an increase in the average growth rate of private investment
in the three years immediately following stock market liberalization.
17Fisman and Love (2002a) and Claessens and Laeven (2002) also investigate whether
external dependence acts as a proxy for relative growth opportunities. Using actual sales
growth in U.S. ﬁrms interacted with ﬁnancial development as a proxy for sectoral diﬀer-
ences in growth opportunities, Fisman and Love (2002a) ﬁnd that including this variable
in the industry growth regression reduces the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient of
14causal eﬀect of liberalization on industrial growth, it describes an alternative
mechanism for this eﬀect.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that if investment intensity is all that
matters and external and internal capital are equally costly, a stock mar-
ket liberalization should not have a diﬀerential impact on industries that
generate a lot of internal cash. However, if liberalization facilitates growth
by reducing the wedge between the cost of internal and external funds, in-
dustries that generate more internal cash face a greater advantage before
liberalization and hence should grow relatively faster prior to liberalization.
We investigate the alternative explanation of the mechanism by which lib-
eralization facilitates growth in two ways. First, we use Rajan and Zingales’
(1998) approach and estimate the following regression:
Growthj,k,t = δ0 + δ1Libk,t + δ2(Lib × Cash ﬂow)j,k,t
+δ3(Lib × Investment intensity)j,k,t
+δ4(Industry share of manufacturing)j,k,t−1
+δ5Ck,t + δkCountry dummies + δt + ηj,k,t, (2)
where Ck,t includes all the country speciﬁc variables described in equation
(1). We reject the alternative investment intensity hypothesis if the coeﬃ-
cient of the interaction term between cash ﬂow intensity and liberalization
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the growth regression. Cash ﬂow
and investment intensity measures are constructed by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) using data on U.S. ﬁrms belonging to the same industry.
Second, we control for investment intensity in the original speciﬁcation
and investigate whether the impact of liberalization on growth continues to
depend on the relative external dependence of industries. Thus, we estimate
the following regression:
Growthj,k,t = γ0 + γ1Libk,t + γ2(Lib × External ﬁnance dependence)j,k,t
+γ3(Lib × Investment intensity)j,k,t
+γ4(Industry share of manufacturing)j,k,t−1
+γ5Ck,t + γkCountry dummies + γt + υj,k,t. (3)
Results from estimating equation (2) with growth in real value added
as the dependent variable are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6A. In
the external dependence variable. However, Claessens and Laeven (2002) argue that sales
growth is an ex-post measure and propose Tobin’s Q as a more forward looking measure
of growth opportunities. Their results reject the growth opportunities hypothesis.
15column 1 using average 1980-1990 values, cash ﬂow intensive industries do
not appear to grow diﬀerently following liberalization while more investment
intensive industries grow signiﬁcantly faster (at the one percent level), hence
we cannot reject the investment intensity argument in this case. However,
in column 2 we ﬁnd support for the original hypothesis that liberalization
aﬀects economic growth by reducing the relative cost of external capital:
controlling for relative investment intensity, the coeﬃcient of the cash ﬂow
interaction term is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (at the ten percent
level). Estimating equation (3) with growth in real value added as the depen-
dent variable in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6A, we do not reject the growth
opportunities hypothesis in column 3. However, in column 4 we observe
that growth in real value added following liberalization does not appear to
depend on either relative investment intensity or relative external ﬁnance
dependence although the coeﬃcient of the external dependence interaction
term is positive.
The results from estimating equations (2) and (3) with growth in number
of establishments as the dependent variable are reported in columns 5 to 8
of Table 6A. The results do not support the investment intensity hypothesis
in any of the speciﬁcations. In column 5 we observe that neither investment
nor cash ﬂow intensity aﬀect the growth of new establishments following
liberalization. Moreover, consistent with the hypothesis that liberalization
reduces the incremental cost of external capital, cash ﬂow rich industries
grow signiﬁcantly faster before liberalization (at the ten percent level) in
column 6. The original hypothesis is also supported by the results reported
in the last column of Table 6A where we observe that more externally depen-
dent industries grow signiﬁcantly faster on average following liberalization
(at the ten percent level) while more investment intensive industries do not.
5.2 Other Economic Reforms
Although we control for omitted variable bias in a number of ways, we may
still be overstating the impact of stock market liberalization on industrial
growth if countries simultaneously implement other economic reforms. To
address this issue, we control for both short-run macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion programs and privatization programs undertaken by the countries in our
sample during the sample period. In particular, to control for the eﬀects of
a stabilization program on industry growth we include a dummy variable
equal to one for the years in which a country entered into a stand-by agree-
ment with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These agreements are
generally ﬁscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies that cover a period of
16one to two years and are designed to overcome balance of payments diﬃcul-
ties. We also control for the eﬀect on industrial growth of the privatization
of a company in a particular industry and country in a given year. From
the results reported in Table 6B, we observe that the estimated coeﬃcients
of the external dependence interaction terms are almost identical in mag-
nitude and statistical signiﬁcance to the results from Table 4 for growth in
real value added and Table 5A for growth in number of establishments as
dependent variables. Undertaking a stabilization program appears to sig-
niﬁcantly reduce the growth rate of real value added in a given year (at the
ten percent level). While privatization of a ﬁrm in a particular industry and
country does not have an eﬀect on average growth in real value added in
that year, it appears to signiﬁcantly reduce (at the ten percent level) annual
growth in number of establishments in that industry.
5.3 Additional Robustness Checks
Since much of the demand for external funds is likely to occur early on in the
life of a company, it may be more appropriate to use external dependence
measures for younger rather than older ﬁrms. In Table 7A we check whether
the results are robust to using external dependence measures for younger
ﬁrms (public for less than ten years) and older ﬁrms (public for more than
ten years). We ﬁnd that both older and younger ﬁrms grow signiﬁcantly
faster on average following liberalization (at the one percent level).
Thus far our sample consists of 19 countries, all but one of which liberal-
ize over the course of the sample time-period. Hence, in any given year the
control group consists of countries that have not yet liberalized. One ad-
vantage of this approach is that we are able to control for dynamic selection
bias. Country ﬁxed eﬀects will not address the dynamic selection bias that
may arise if governments choose to liberalize based on time-varying charac-
teristics that are unobservable to the researcher. To address this potential
bias, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) suggest comparing
the treated group to a control group that has been selected for treatment
but not yet been treated, and hence is likely to share the same unobservable
characteristics.
As an additional robustness check, we extend the size of our sample to
31 emerging markets which includes an additional four countries that do
not liberalize and eight countries that undertake liberalization during the
sample period. We obtain liberalization dates for the additional countries
from Table 2 of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002b) where these dates
are described as oﬃcial policy changes. Table 7B reports the results from
17estimating equation (1) using the larger sample. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients
of the external dependence interaction terms are positive although slightly
less statistically signiﬁcant with growth in real value added as the dependent
variable. However, the coeﬃcients of all the interaction terms are positive
and highly statistically signiﬁcant with growth in number of establishments
as the dependent variable. We estimate all the speciﬁcations using the larger
sample and the results are substantively similar.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the causal link between
ﬁnancial development and economic growth in three ways. First, we use
a natural experiment, stock market liberalizations, to avoid the potential
endogeneity between ﬁnancial development and growth. Second, we use
panel data to investigate cross-sectional and time-series variation in ﬁnan-
cial development and to control for contemporaneous shocks. Finally, rather
than examining the relationship between ﬁnancial development and aggre-
gate economic growth, we investigate whether stock market liberalizations
facilitate growth through the particular mechanism of reducing market im-
perfections that drive a wedge between the costs of external and internal
capital to ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether industries that depend
more on external ﬁnancing for their investment needs are likely to grow
faster on average following a stock market liberalization.
We ﬁnd no evidence of a uniform shift in average industry growth across
all sectors following liberalization. Instead, it appears that liberalizations
lead to signiﬁcantly higher growth in industries that depend more on exter-
nal ﬁnance. These results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations, industry
and country speciﬁc controls, world business cycle eﬀects, alternative sam-
ples, and contemporaneous economic reforms. Thus, our results suggest that
liberalizations facilitate economic growth by reducing the incremental cost
of external capital rather than simply by lowering the overall cost of capital
in the economy. This conclusion receives further support from the result
that growth appears to occur through the creation of new establishments,
which is more likely to require external funds, rather than through an ex-
pansion in the average size of existing establishments, which ﬁrms are more
likely to ﬁnance with internal cash. From a policy perspective the evidence
of a diﬀerential impact on industrial growth, with some industries beneﬁt-
ing more than others from stock market liberalization, can be useful for the
design of liberalization programs and accompanying industrial policies.
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Real Value 
Added
Number of 
Establishments
Average 
Size
311 Food products 0.137 0.662 -0.052 0.058 0.002 0.261 0.226 0.043 0.011 0.026
(0.518) (0.338) (0.567)
313 Beverages 0.077 0.633 -0.146 -0.057 0.0004 0.264 0.243 0.031 0.005 0.024
(0.544) (0.259) (0.602)
314 Tobacco -0.451 -0.375 -0.126 -0.083 0.228 0.331 0.008 -0.006 0.010
(0.786) (0.310) (0.867)
321 Textiles 0.4 0.664 0.141 -0.04 0.012 0.245 0.147 0.004 0.011 -0.016
(0.583) (0.298) (0.662)
322 Wearing apparel,  0.029 0.27 -0.02 0.031 0 0.306 0.297 0.093 0.055 0.029
except footwear (0.624) (0.528) (0.718)
323 Leather products -0.14 -1.535 -1.33 -0.038 0 0.215 0.245 0.037 0.030 -0.007
(0.501) (0.313) (0.493)
324 Footwear, except  -0.078 0.65 -0.573 -0.261 0.036 0.245 0.264 0.029 0.025 0.002
rubber or plastic (0.399) (0.388) (0.468)
331 Wood products,  0.284 0.345 0.249 0.28 0.035 0.259 0.186 0.009 0.003 0.001
except furniture (0.555) (0.375) (0.608)
332 Furniture, except  0.236 0.683 0.329 0.161 0.009 0.25 0.191 0.039 0.030 0.016
metal (0.613) (0.404) (0.640)
341 Paper and pulp products 0.176 0.573 0.104 -0.006 0.02 0.242 0.199 0.043 0.018 0.020
(0.522) (0.217) (0.541)
342 Printing and publishing 0.204 0.599 0.136 -0.01 0.033 0.393 0.313 0.057 0.020 0.029
(0.638) (0.273) (0.660)
352 Other chemicals 0.219 1.351 -0.184 -0.073 0.019 0.312 0.243 0.039 0.022 0.049
(0.287) (0.243) (0.739)
External Finance 
Dependence in 1980s
Table 1 
Pattern of External Financial Dependence and Average Growth Across Industries 
External 
Finance 
Dependence 
in 1970s
Equity 
Finance 
Dependence 
in 1980s
Investment 
Intensity in 
1980s
Cashflow 
Intensity 
in 1980s
Average Growth Rate ofISIC Industrial Sectors All Young Old
Real Value 
Added
Number of 
Establishments
Average 
Size
353 Petroleum refineries 0.042 0.852 -0.022 0.056 0.000 0.224 0.215 0.031 0.029 -0.008
(0.507) (0.293) (0.592)
354 Misc. petroleum and  0.334 -0.259 0.162 -0.211 0.057 0.227 0.151 0.052 0.029 0.011
coal products (0.464) (0.301) (0.440)
355 Rubber products 0.226 0.502 -0.123 0.073 0.107 0.28 0.217 0.005 0.017 -0.015
(0.591) (0.328) (0.645)
356 Plastic products 1.14 1.14 0.262 0.445 -0.062 0.068 0.044 0.018
(0.578) (0.263) (0.609)
361 Pottery, china,  -0.146 -0.411 0.163 -0.45 0.11 0.203 0.233 0.038 -0.010 0.044
earthenware (0.695) (0.539) (0.840)
362 Glass and products 0.528 1.519 0.031 0.066 0.023 0.275 0.13 0.041 0.000 0.037
(0.287) (0.330) (0.418)
369 Other non-metallic  0.062 -0.032 0.152 0.09 0.01 0.206 0.193 0.022 0.024 -0.014
mineral products (0.348) (0.366) (0.451)
371 Iron and steel 0.087 0.259 0.087 -0.013 0.01 0.177 0.161 0.051 0.017 0.026
(0.689) (0.384) (0.717)
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.005 0.458 0.073 0.194 0.021 0.223 0.222 0.057 0.025 0.032
(0.562) (0.270) (0.541)
381 Fabricated metal  0.237 0.866 0.044 0.166 0.025 0.289 0.22 0.037 0.034 0.001
products (0.317) (0.375) (0.428)
382 Machinery, except  0.445 0.753 0.217 0.156 0.109 0.289 0.16 0.072 0.049 0.023
electrical (0.779) (0.366) (0.679)
383 Machinery, electric 0.767 1.219 0.23 0.262 0.358 0.378 0.088 0.053 0.040 0.015
(0.598) (0.242) (0.584)
384 Transport equipment 0.307 0.577 0.163 0.226 0.051 0.309 0.214 0.041 0.029 0.008
(0.682) (0.293) (0.664)
Investment 
Intensity in 
1980s
Cashflow 
Intensity 
in 1980s
Average Growth Rate of
Pattern of External Financial Dependence and Average Growth Across Industries 
Table 1 continued
External Finance 
Dependence in 1980s
External 
Finance 
Dependence 
in 1970s
Equity 
Finance 
Dependence 
in 1980sISIC Industrial Sectors All Young Old
Real Value 
Added
Number of 
Establishments
Average 
Size
385 Professional &  0.961 1.629 0.194 0.4 0.619 0.449 0.017 0.061 0.032 0.020
scientific equipment (0.663) (0.376) (0.683)
390 Other manufactured  0.47 0.803 -0.051 0.121 0.164 0.368 0.195 0.051 0.026 0.022
products (0.507) (0.492) (0.537)
Average 0.243 0.568 -0.015 0.041 0.074 0.280 0.194 0.041 0.022 0.015
Std. dev. (0.336) (0.644) (0.334) (0.180) (0.140) (0.071) (0.083) (0.573) (0.349) (0.613)
External Finance 
Dependence in 1980s
External 
Finance 
Dependence 
in 1970s
Equity 
Finance 
Dependence 
in 1980s
Investment 
Intensity in 
1980s
Cashflow 
Intensity 
in 1980s
Average Growth Rate of
External finance dependence is the average fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds. External finance dependence in 1980s and 1970s is 
the median value of average external dependence between 1980-1990 and 1970-1980 respectively among U.S. firms belonging to the same industry. Equity 
finance dependence is the ratio of net amount of equity issues to capital expenditures. Equity Finance Dependence in 1980s is the median value of average equity 
dependence between 1980-1990 among U.S. firms belonging to the same industry. Cash flow is defined as the ratio of cash flow from operations to net property 
plant and equipment. Cash flow in 1980s is the median value of average cash flow between 1980-1990 among U.S. firms in the same industry. Investment 
intensity is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to property plant and equipment. Investment Intensity in 1980s is the median value of average investment 
intensity between 1980-1990 among U.S. firms in the same industry. Average growth rates of real value added, number of establishments, and establishment size 
are reported for the largest sample of 31 countries with standard deviations in parentheses.
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.
 Variable
Liberalization   -0.036 -0.031 -0.033 0.190 * 0.186 * 0.190 *
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.119) (0.117) (0.118)
Interaction (Liberalization * External  0.037 **    -0.005    
Finance Dependence in 1980s) (0.016) (0.03)
Interaction (Liberalization * External   0.059 **    -0.003  
Finance Dependence in 1970s) (0.026) (0.043)
Interaction (Liberalization * Equity     0.079 *    -0.023
Finance Dependence in 1980s) (0.041) (0.059)
Lagged Share of Industry Value Added -0.038 -0.044 -0.028 -0.797 *** -0.787 *** -0.800 ***
(0.062) (0.065) (0.062) (0.265) (0.259) (0.268)
Openness to Trade 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
English Legal Origin 0.306 0.320 0.306 0.934 * 1.842 0.934 *
(0.391) (0.397) (0.390) (0.543) (1.701) (0.543)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.083 0.088 0.082 0.524 0.509 0.524
(0.138) (0.140) (0.137) (0.552) (0.542) (0.552)
OECD Growth 0.039 ** 0.040 ** 0.039 ** -0.005 -0.035 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.037) (0.016)
Human Capital 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Private Credit/ GDP -0.091 -0.099 -0.091 -0.519 -0.497 -0.519
(0.204) (0.207) (0.204) (0.543) (0.535) (0.543)
Table 5A
Decomposing Sources of Growth: Number of Establishments and Size
Growth in
Average Establishment Size Number of EstablishmentsVariable
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Number of Observations 6204 5966 6176 6176 5938 6176
R
2 0.076 0.076 0.064 0.067 0.068 0.067
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 5A continued
Decomposing Sources of Growth: Number of Establishments and Size
Growth in
Number of Establishments Average Establishment Size
The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the difference between the log of number of establishments in each year and the log of number of 
establishments in the previous year for each ISIC industry in each country. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the difference in logs of 
average establishment size calculated as real value added in each year divided by the number of establishments in that year for each ISIC 
industry in each country. External Finance Dependence is the average fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds. Equity 
Finance Dependence is the average fraction of capital expenditures financed through public offerings. Lagged Share of Industry Value Added 
is the ratio of real value added of each industry to the sum of real value added for all industries, in the previous year. Openness to Trade is the 
annual ratio of the sum of imports and exports to total GDP. English Legal Origin is a dummy variable equal to one for countries with an 
English legal system. Log Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of annual per capita GDP measured in constant 1995 US$. OECD Growth is the 
annual average growth rate of GDP in OECD countries. Human Capital is the annual share of secondary school enrollment in total enrollment. 
Private Credit/GDP is annual domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. V
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 Variable
Liberalization  0.094 0.131 0.107 0.129 -0.027 -0.015 -0.032 -0.016
(0.132) (0.138) (0.133) (0.138) (0.072) (0.093) (0.077) (0.094)
Interaction (Liberalization *  0.035 -0.101
Cash flow in 1980s) (0.064) (0.068)
Interaction (Liberalization *  -0.192 * -0.328 *
Cash flow in 1970s) (0.121) (0.163)
Interaction (Liberalization  *  0.210 *** 0.184 ** 0.068 -0.018
Investment Intensity in 1980s) (0.052) (0.082) (0.081) (0.109)
Interaction (Liberalization  *  0.286 ** 0.108 0.250 * -0.066
Investment Intensity in 1970s) (0.125) (0.104) (0.124) (0.123)
Interaction (Liberalization * External  0.001 0.040
Finance Dependence in 1980s) (0.024) (0.024)
Interaction (Liberalization * External  0.037 0.069 *
Finance Dependence in 1970s) (0.029) (0.034)
Lagged Share of Industry Value Added -0.829 *** -0.824 *** -0.828 -0.826 -0.035 -0.041 -0.038 -0.045
(0.264) (0.259) (0.262) (0.259) (0.062) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066)
Openness to Trade 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
English Legal Origin 0.805 * 2.160 0.805 * 2.160 0.306 0.320 0.306 0.320
(0.393) (1.586) (0.393) (1.586) (0.391) (0.398) (0.391) (0.398)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.608 0.598 0.608 0.598 0.082 0.088 0.082 0.088
(0.514) (0.504) (0.514) (0.504) (0.138) (0.140) (0.138) (0.140)
Growth Effect of Financial Liberalization: Investment Intensity and Cost of Capital
Table 6A
Growth in
Real Value Added Number of EstablishmentsVariable
OECD Growth 0.034 ** -0.003 ** 0.034 *** -0.003 0.039 ** 0.040 ** 0.039 ** 0.040 **
(0.011) (0.040) (0.011) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Human Capital -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Private Credit/ GDP -0.616 -0.603 -0.616 -0.603 -0.091 -0.099 -0.091 -0.099
(0.521) (0.512) (0.521) (0.512) (0.204) (0.207) (0.204) (0.207)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19 19  19 19 19
Number of Observations 6176 5938 6176 5938 6204 5966 6204 5966
R
2 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Table 6A
Growth Effect of Financial Liberalization: Investment Intensity and Cost of Capital
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Growth in
Real Value Added Number of Establishments
The dependent variable in columns 1 - 4 is the annual growth rate in real value added measured as the difference between the log of real value added in each 
year and the log of real value added in the previous year for each ISIC industry in each country.  The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the difference 
between the log of number of establishments in each year and the log of number of establishments in the previous year for each ISIC industry in each 
country.  Cash flow is defined as the ratio of cash flow from operations to net property plant and equipment. External Finance Dependence is the average 
fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds. Investment intensity is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to property plant and 
equipment. Lagged Share of Industry Value Added is the ratio of real value added of each industry to the sum of real value added for all industries, in the 
previous year. Openness to Trade is the annual ratio of the sum of imports and exports to total GDP. English Legal Origin is a dummy variable equal to one 
for countries with an English legal system. Log Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of annual per capita GDP measured in constant 1995 US$. OECD Growth 
is the annual average growth rate of GDP in OECD countries. Human Capital is the annual share of secondary school enrollment in total enrollment. Private 
Credit/GDP is annual domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. Variable
Liberalization  0.009 0.012 0.012 -0.017 -0.010 -0.014
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Interaction (Liberalization * External  0.029 * 0.036 **    
Finance Dependence in 1980s) (0.015) (0.016)
Interaction (Liberalization * External  0.059 **  0.060 **  
Finance Dependence in 1970s) (0.026) (0.028)
Interaction (Liberalization * Equity  0.059 *    0.076 *
Finance Dependence in 1980s) (0.035) (0.040)
Stabilization  -0.236 * -0.229 * -0.236 * -0.018 -0.018 -0.018
(0.124) (0.121) (0.124) (0.054) (0.057) (0.054)
Industry Privatization 0.006 0.009 0.006 -0.019 * -0.017 * -0.019 *
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Lagged Share of Industry Value Added -0.805 *** -0.810 *** -0.798 *** -0.041 -0.049 -0.031
(0.260) (0.257) (0.263) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063)
Openness to Trade -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
English Legal Origin 0.876 * 1.015 0.875 * -0.206 -0.196 -0.206
(0.493) (0.697) (0.493) (0.277) (0.279) (0.277)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.299 0.300 0.299 0.113 0.120 0.113
(0.251) (0.247) (0.251) (0.122) (0.124) (0.122)
OECD Growth 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.030 ** 0.031 *** 0.030 **
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Human Capital -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Growth in
Number of Establishments
Table 6B
Growth Effect of Financial Liberalization: Other Economic Reforms
Real Value AddedVariable
Private Credit/ GDP -0.504 -0.497 -0.504 -0.128 -0.135 -0.128
(0.395) (0.392) (0.395) (0.191) (0.194) (0.191)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Number of Observations 6168 5930 6168 6196 5958 6196
R
2 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.062 0.061 0.062
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 6B continued
Growth Effect of Financial Liberalization: Other Economic Reforms
Growth in
Real Value Added Number of Establishments
The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the difference between the log of real value added in each year and the log of real value added in the 
previous year for each ISIC industry in each country. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the difference between the log of number of 
establishments in each year and the log of number of establishments in the previous year for each ISIC industry in each country. Liberalization 
is a dummy variable equal to one for the year in which the country undertook liberalization and thereafter. External Finance Dependence is the 
average fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds. Equity Finance Dependence is the average fraction of capital 
expenditures financed through public offerings. Stabilization is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the year(s) in which a country entered 
into a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Industry Privatization is a dummy variable that is equal to one for a ISIC 
industry in a country if a company in that industry is privatized that year in that country. Lagged Share of Industry Value Added is the ratio of 
real value added of each industry to the sum of real value added for all industries, in the previous year. Openness to Trade is the annual ratio of 
the sum of imports and exports to total GDP. English Legal Origin is a dummy variable equal to one for countries with an English legal system. 
Log Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of annual per capita GDP measured in constant 1995 US$. OECD Growth is the annual average growth 
rate of GDP in OECD countries. Human Capital is the annual share of secondary school enrollment in total enrollment. Private Credit/GDP is 
annual domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. Variable
Liberalization Dummy 0.156 0.154 -0.028 -0.033
(0.129) (0.129) (0.079) (0.081)
Interaction (Liberalization Dummy * External  0.039 *** - 0.018
Finance Dependence of Old Firms in 1980s) (0.012) (0.012)
Interaction (Liberalization Dummy * External  - 0.022 *** 0.010
Finance Dependence of Young Firms in 1980s) (0.005) (0.007)
Lagged Share of Industry Value Added -0.832 *** -0.824 *** -0.041 -0.033
(0.261) (0.245) (0.066) (0.068)
Openness to Trade 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
English Legal Origin 2.162 0.784 * 0.320 0.322
(1.587) (0.383) (0.398) (0.405)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.599 0.597 0.088 0.088
(0.505) (0.503) (0.140) (0.143)
OECD Growth -0.003 0.035 *** 0.040 ** 0.040 **
(0.040) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Human Capital -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Private Credit/ GDP -0.604 -0.612 -0.099 -0.107
(0.512) (0.508) (0.207) (0.206)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19
Number of Observations 5938 5942 5966 5970
R
2 0.064 0.066 0.076 0.076
Real Value Added
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
Growth in
Growth Effect of Financial Liberalization: Old versus Young Firms
Table 7A
Number of Establishments
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the difference between the log of real value added in each year and the log of 
real value added in the previous year for each ISIC industry in each country. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is 
the difference between the log of number of establishments in each year and the log of number of establishments in the 
previous year for each ISIC industry in each country. Liberalization is a dummy variable equal to one for the year in which 
the country undertook liberalization and thereafter. External Finance Dependence is the average fraction of capital 
expenditures not financed with internal funds. Old firms have been public for more than ten years, and young firms for less 
than ten years. Lagged Share of Industry Value Added is the ratio of real value added of each industry to the sum of real 
value added for all industries, in the previous year. Openness to Trade is the annual ratio of the sum of imports and exports 
to total GDP. English Legal Origin is a dummy variable equal to one for countries with an English legal system. Log Per 
Capita GDP is the logarithm of annual per capita GDP measured in constant 1995 US$. OECD Growth is the annual 
average growth rate of GDP in OECD countries. Human Capital is the annual share of secondary school enrollment in total 
enrollment. Private Credit/GDP is annual domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. Variable
Liberalization Dummy 0.128 0.129 * 0.131 * 0.024 -0.020 -0.021
(0.081) (0.080) (0.082) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Interaction (Liberalization Dummy *  0.022 0.035 **
External Finance Dependence in 1980s) (0.015) (0.014)
Interaction (Liberalization Dummy *  0.041 * 0.067 ***
External Finance Dependence in 1970s)  (0.023) (0.025)
Interaction (Liberalization Dummy * Equity 0.021 * 0.074 **
Finance Dependence in 1980s) (0.043) (0.037)
Lagged Share of Industry Value Added -0.721 *** -0.711 *** -0.721 *** 0.035 0.029 0.041
(0.186) (0.183) (0.189) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
Openness to Trade 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
English Legal Origin 1.504 1.485 1.504 -0.134 -0.015 -0.134
(1.197) (1.168) (1.197) (0.160) (0.326) (0.160)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.504 0.495 0.504 0.110 0.115 0.110
(0.395) (0.386) (0.395) (0.128) (0.129) (0.128)
OECD Growth 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.027 * 0.027 * 0.027 *
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Human Capital -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Growth Effect of Financial Liberalization: Sample of 31 Countries
Table 7B
Real Value Added
Growth in
Number of EstablishmentsVariable
Private Credit/ GDP -0.480 -0.465 -0.480 -0.101 -0.109 -0.101
(0.418) (0.410) (0.417) (0.193) (0.196) (0.194)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Countries 31 31 31 31 31 31
Number of Observations 7926 7638 7926 7885 7595 7885
R
2 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.064 0.064 0.064
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 7B continued
Growth Effect of Financial Liberalization: Sample of 31 Countries
Growth in
Number of Establishments Real Value Added
The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the difference between the log of real value added in each year and the log of real value added in the 
previous year for each ISIC industry in each country. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the difference between the log of number of 
establishments in each year and the log of number of establishments in the previous year for each ISIC industry in each country. Liberalization is a 
dummy variable equal to one for the year in which the country undertook liberalization and thereafter. External Finance Dependence is the average 
fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds. Equity Finance Dependence is the average fraction of capital expenditures 
financed through public offerings. Lagged Share of Industry Value Added is the ratio of real value added of each industry to the sum of real value 
added for all industries, in the previous year. Openness to Trade is the annual ratio of the sum of imports and exports to total GDP. English Legal 
Origin is a dummy variable equal to one for countries with an English legal system. Log Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of annual per capita GDP 
measured in constant 1995 US$. OECD Growth is the annual average growth rate of GDP in OECD countries. Human Capital is the annual share of 
secondary school enrollment in total enrollment. Private Credit/GDP is annual domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. I
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